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Article 5

The Real Politik of Writing and
Reading Statutes
Eric Lane†
INTRODUCTION
How much work does language do in the interpretation
of statutes? This symposium question returns me1 to the
persistent argument of Justice Antonin Scalia, now entering
his twenty-fifth year on the Supreme Court, that statutory
language should and can do almost all of the work for courts in
statutory interpretation cases. I agree, constitutionally, with
the “should.” But with respect to the “can”—as Part II of this
article explores through the voices of selected judges—in most
appellate court cases statutory language cannot provide the
ergs needed to answer the litigated question, although courts
often wish that it would provide further guidance.
I.

THE SCALIA DOCTRINE OF LIMITING CONGRESSIONAL
REACH

Justice Scalia ascended to the Court under the banner
of textualism—an interpretive theory that demands that judges
follow the law as it is written. This alone should have been no
head-turner. The Constitution commands such loyalty from its
judges. If the language of a statute provides a clear answer to a
question or questions presented in a case, “the sole function of
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”2 And in the
†

Eric J. Schmertz Professor of Public Law and Public Service at Hofstra
Law School and Senior Fellow at the Brennan Center of Justice at NYU. Thanks to
Lindsay Greene for her exploration and analysis of the statutory opinions of Justice
Antonin Scalia from the Court’s 2009 term. Thanks also to the Brooklyn Law Review
for the opportunity to think again about statutory interpretation in the company of
such distinguished colleagues.
1
See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia’s
Revolutionary Call to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV. 121 (2000).
2
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 265 (1990) (a statute is “a command issued
by a superior body (the legislature) to a subordinate body (the judiciary)”).
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overwhelming number of cases in which the meaning of the
questioned statute is clear, the courts do apply the statutes as
written. But the appellate courts’ commitment to the
application of a statute’s clear meaning (the “clear” or “plain
meaning” rule) is more of a rhetorical starting point than a
reality. Cases that reach the Supreme Court or the states’
highest courts typically involve complex questions of statutory
interpretation that courts cannot always resolve by examining
a statute’s plain meaning.
Sometimes, even when a statute’s language is clear,
judges will ignore it. The primary reason for judges’ dismissal
of plain statutory language is almost always their distaste for
the consequences of applying a statute as it was written. Often,
a court is sympathetic (or unsympathetic) to the plight of a
particular party or to the particular policy expressed in a
statute. But for the most part, courts do not nakedly announce
their disobedience to the law.3 They do not want to confess their
constitutional sins. Rather, they dress up their decision in
language intended to convince the public that, despite the
particular law’s clear command, the legislature never intended
its application in this particular case.
Of course, this is a construct. If the language of a
statute is clear, a court should never find that extratextual
evidence is sufficient to support a contrary statutory meaning.
But the Court has not always remained faithful to this
principle. Holy Trinity Church v. United States4 is an
archetypal example of judicial disregard for clear statutory
language. In Holy Trinity Church, the Court decided whether a
church that imported a foreign minister violated a statute that
3

Sometimes a judge will actually acknowledge that his refusal to apply the
clear language of a statute is based on his or her own view of what is right. For
example, in dissent in United States v. Marshall, Judge Richard Posner anchored his
view in “natural law” or judicial authority “to enrich positive law with the moral values
and practical concerns of civilized society.” 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J., dissenting). In Marshall the question was whether a statute establishing penalties
for the distribution of “10 grams or more of a mixture or a substance containing a
detectable amount of . . . LSD” really meant what it said. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(v)-(B)(v) (2006). The problem for Posner was that the manner by which
LSD was retailed might result in retailers being punished more seriously than
suppliers or wholesalers. To Posner, this result was so unfair that he could not
attribute it to any rational congressional intent, apparently never even imagining that
Congress may have in fact wanted to strategically punish the lower, and more visible,
end of the LSD marketing chain to reduce demand. What makes this case also very
interesting is that only a year earlier in United States v. Rose, 881 F.2d 386, 387 (7th
Cir. 1989), Judge Posner had applied the plain meaning of the same statute.
4
143 U.S. 457 (1891).
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prohibited U.S. employers from paying for or assisting in the
importation of foreigners “to perform labor or service of any
kind” in U.S. territory.5 Although the clear language of the
statute indicated that Holy Trinity Church was liable for
importing the English minister, the Court could not bring itself
to find that Congress had meant to include a minister within
the definition of foreigners imported “to perform . . . service of
any kind.” Reading the statute through the screen of its own
Christian vision of America, the Court found this outcome
distasteful and absurd, and rationalized its disregard of the
statute’s clear language under the guise of preserving the
statute’s legislative intent: “It is a familiar rule that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of
its makers.”6 The Court did not even consider the possibility
that, although Congress clearly did not intend to restrict
Christianity in the United States, it explicitly intended to
provide an incentive for the employment of American citizens,
including American ministers. Justice Scalia rightly
characterizes this decision as “nothing but an invitation to
judicial lawmaking.”7
Despite notable cases like Holy Trinity Church, courts
have generally honored their duty to apply clear statutory
language as it was written, even prior to Scalia’s appointment
to the bench. Yet, at the time of Scalia’s first judicial post in
1982, public perception, fueled by Ronald Reagan’s first
presidential campaign in 1980, fomented the belief that judicial
activism was a widespread problem.8 These exaggerated claims
of pervasive judicial lawmaking were, to a large extent,
referring to the Court’s 1979 decision in United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber (United Steelworkers).9 In
United Steelworkers, the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 allowed a racially based job preference against a white
person. The majority claimed that the antidiscriminatory
5

Id. at 458.
Id. at 459.
7
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 21 (1998).
8
See Sondra Hemeryck et al., Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and
Legislative Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475,
501-02 (1990); Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative
Action, and the March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS.
L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2001).
9
443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
6
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purpose of the Civil Rights Act was limited to protecting
minorities, and that this perceived limitation trumped the
statute’s broad, inclusive, and clear anti-discriminatory
language, because the complainant in United Steelworkers was
white.10 The Court also disregarded the legislative record of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which evidenced a strong legislative
commitment against affirmative action.11 This decision
undermined the fundamental compromises that undergirded
the passage of the Civil Rights Act and partially fueled the
explosion of social opposition to affirmative action that helped
blast Reagan into office in 1980.12
For the type of judicial overreaching exemplified by
United Steelworkers, Scalia’s commitment to textualism was
and is a corrective approach. And over the years, it has had the
positive effect of limiting courts’ occasional desire to reach
beyond clear statutory text.13 But it is not Scalia’s textualism
that has made him unique. Rather, it is his persistent refusal
to use legislative history as a source for statutory meaning in
situations where the statute itself does not provide a clear
answer to the question before the Court. The litany of
disavowals is familiar to even casual readers of the Court’s
opinions: “I join the opinion of the Court [or the dissent],
excluding, of course, its resort . . . to what was said by
individual legislators and committees of legislators . . . .”14 Or,
as he declared in his concurrence in Graham County Soil &
Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson, “[i]t
is utterly impossible to discern what the Members of Congress
intended except to the extent that intent is manifested in the
only remnant of ‘history’ that bears the unanimous
endorsement of the majority in each House: the text of the
enrolled bill that became law.”15
Scalia’s stated objection to legislative history is not the
product of the entire legislature, but rather the product of a
lesser body within the legislature (committees) or even of
10

Id. at 201-04.
See id. at 238 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6564
(1964)) (“Senator Kuchel emphasized[,] . . . ‘Employers and labor organizations could
not discriminate in favor of or against a person because of his race, his religion, or his
national origin. In such matters . . . the bill now before us . . . is color blind.’”).
12
See Hemeryck et al., supra note 8, at 501-02; Iheukwumere, supra note 8, at 8-10.
13
See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in
the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205.
14
Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 344
(1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
15
130 S. Ct. 1396, 1411 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
11
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individual members of Congress.16 First, this reliance on
committee reports offends his view of the Constitution’s
Presentment Clause and of Article I generally.17 Second, Scalia
complains that committee reports, overall the most probative
evidence of legislative meaning short of statutory language, are
unread by members of Congress and are the products of their
unsupervised staff.18 His basis for this determination is hard to
find. In fact, rather than even look for empirical support, he
effectively takes judicial notice of the verity of his own
conclusion:
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional
committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases [in this
particular example] were inserted, at best by a committee staff
member on his or her own initiative, and at worst . . . at the
suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references
was not primarily to inform Members of Congress . . . but rather to
influence judicial construction.19

Both criticisms are wrong. Constitutionally, Article I is
not a barrier to the use of legislative history in cases of
statutory interpretation. As Professor James Brudney has
rightly written,
Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to organize itself in
fulfillment of its legislative mission and requires Congress to publish
a record of its legislative proceedings. . . . [D]ating from the earliest
Congresses, were the determination to favor detailed public
reporting of floor debates and the decision to create permanent
standing committees that produced oral and then written committee
reports. Taken together, these innovations led to the development of
legislative history as a means of informing and persuading members
of Congress regarding the bills on which they were to vote.20

Scalia’s second criticism of committee reports is strange,
particularly given the absence of any evidence that it is true.
While statistically it must be assumed that there are instances
in which legislative staffers insert unauthorized material into
legislative committee reports, as both Professors Victoria
Nourse and James Brudney (both Senate staff alumni)
reported at this symposium, such conduct is rare and would
16

See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 35.
See id.
18
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
19
Id.
20
James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch
Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1200-01 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
17
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most likely end in the offender’s termination. On this front,
perhaps we would all be better served by Justice Scalia’s
reaction to Judge Posner’s informed observation about judges
delegating too much authority to law clerks.21
The use of probative legislative history—legislative
history on which Congress relies to establish meaning22—is
both constitutional and, in Justice Stephen Breyer’s words,
“natural.” “Legislative history helps a court understand the
context and purpose of a statute.”23
Legislative history also limits judicial law making
(although Justice Scalia would disagree). Courts use legislative
history to inform their understanding of statutes’ intended
legislative meanings—a process that enhances, rather than
inhibits, judicial deference to Congress’s law-making authority.
The choice before courts in such cases is not between clear text
and probative legislative history. Rather, the choice is almost
always between probative legislative history and “whatever.”
For Scalia, the “whatever” is either selected canons of statutory
construction (including one principle that Abner Mikva and I
characterized some years ago as “ambiguous statutes should be
read narrowly”), or a form of the “reasonable man test,”
through which he hopes to find a meaning that is “reasonable,
consistent, and faithful to [the statute’s] apparent purpose.”24
Of course, legislative history cannot be employed in this effort.
Scalia characterizes this approach as a theory of statutory
construction that gives meaning to the phrase “a government of
laws.”25 But, in practice, this characterization is false.
Rather, Justice Scalia’s aversion to the use of legislative
history is, to paraphrase Judge Posner, more political than
epistemological, more about freedom from “the fetters of text
and legislative intent in applying statutes”26 than about finding
the meaning of a statue. His goal is not merely to find the
meaning of a statute in a particular case; more broadly, it is to
systematically limit the legislative reach of statutes. It is the
latter that necessitates Scalia’s canon of reading statutes
narrowly. The review of cases that Mikva and I published in
21

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 225 (1985).
See generally Tiefer, supra note 13; Mikva & Lane, supra note 1, at 848.
23
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992).
24
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989).
25
SCALIA, supra note 7, at 17.
26
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 271 (1990).
22
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1999 evidence this point,27 and my review of cases from the
Court’s last term, for the most part, confirms this perspective.
II.

THE REAL WORK OF READING STATUTES

Most judges do not think that their work is so
revolutionary. Years ago, I had the opportunity to explore this
observation. The occasion was a panel that I was asked to plan
and moderate for the U.S. Judicial Conference for the District
of New Jersey.28 Among the panelists were former (then
current) governor of New Jersey and former member of
Congress, James Florio; circuit court Judge Robert Cowen; U.S.
District Court judges for the District New Jersey Nicholas
Politan and Stephen Orlofsky; prominent practitioners Fred
Becker and Michael Cole; and finally, former member of
Congress, former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, and former counsel to the President of the
United States, Abner J. Mikva.
I recount below much of the relevant exchange to show
the inapplicability of Scalia’s theory of interpretation to unclear
statutes, and to show what judges actually do to interpret
statutes in the context of a particular case.
The topic for the panel was the drafting and application
of unclear statutes. For this topic, I chose section 703 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the problem of
determining which party has the burden of persuasion in
disparate impact cases in which defendants assert the defense
of business justification. The statute was silent on this point,
and that silence created a serious litigation problem for
potential plaintiffs. As Mr. Cole noted, “if you place the burden
on the plaintiff we might as well not have adopted this statute
because nothing will change. It is an impossible burden.”29 In
fact, this concern was so prevalent that the Supreme Court
addressed it twice. The first time, in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,30 the Court placed the burden on employers. But eighteen
years later, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,31 a far more

27

See generally Mikva & Lane, supra note 1.
The Twenty-First Annual United States Judicial Conference for the
District of New Jersey, Mar. 13, 1997 [hereinafter Conference Transcript].
29
Id. at 42.
30
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
31
490 U.S. 642 (1989). This decision was almost immediately reversed by the
Congress through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
28
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conservative Court reversed Griggs by placing the burden of
proof on the plaintiff employees.
Just the mention of these two cases to the panel elicited
an interesting exchange between Judges Mikva and Cowen
regarding the role of the Supreme Court. Mikva saw the
reversal as “cardinal sin” of statutory interpretation—judicial
“policymaking in the worse sense of the word.”32 But Judge
Cowen, for better or worse, believed that the role of the
Supreme Court was fundamentally different, which was
evidenced when he replied, “I want to slightly disagree with
you Abner. . . . We have to recognize that the Supreme Court is
really not a court. . . . It is a policy and social institution . . . .
They are not, like a District Court or a Court of Appeals, bound
by what they conceive to be the law.”33
At the panel, the first question asked was why Congress
would fail to address such an important issue. Florio responded
that, while sometimes omissions were a matter of oversight, in
this case it was more likely “a conscious policy by the
legislature to make sure that something is ambiguous, because
failure to have that ambiguity would result in no legislative
outcome.”34 Mikva was blunter. He believed that for Congress,
“[t]he easiest answer was to punt.”35 He later added a basic
principle of legislative logic to his analysis—“a half a loaf is
always better than nothing.”36
Judges, at least those in this group, do not appreciate
this logic. Ambiguity shifts the work of policy making to the
courts, no matter how much they try to gussy up that fact. It is
now up to the judge to decide the breadth of the statute in a
particular case. And there are of course consequences for the
losing party. Reflecting on that point, Judge Politan argued the
following in response to the explanation provided by Florio and
Mikva:
[I] think they should not punt. This is not a game of punting. It is not
a game of positioning. It is a game of discharging your legislative
responsibility no matter how hard it may be. You have to respond to
the people who vote for you. And don’t do that and switch it around,

32
33
34
35
36

Conference Transcript, supra note 28, at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 61.
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punt it, throw it to the judiciary and then get up in Congress and say,
they are legislating in the judiciary, they shouldn’t be doing that.37

Judge Politan’s frustration perhaps could be eased if he had a
better understanding of the legislative process. As was well
established in Professor Nourse and Schacter’s article, The
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study,38
legislators and their staff have different missions, and operate
under far different pressures and circumstances than judges.
The most obvious difference is that, for a bill to become a law,
it must have the support of at least a majority of members of
each house—often a supermajority in the Senate—and the
support of the President. As a result, the last thing that
legislators and legislative staffers are worried about as they try
to build supportive coalitions is whether a court will have a
hard time applying the statute in the future. It is unknown
whether Congress omitted specific regulation of the burden of
proof for the business justification defense due to lack of
foresight or as part of a legislative compromise. But from a
legislative perspective, it was the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 that mattered, regardless of the potential problems
that the courts or Congress may have later confronted.
But judicial annoyance over legislative drafting does not
remove a court’s duty to resolve the issue. The court has to
make a decision. It cannot remand the case to the legislature
or, as Judge Easterbrook has suggested, simply ignore the
unclear statute.39 And to provide such answers, legislative
history was the first place that at least two judicial members of
the panel said they would look. In particular, Judge Orlofsky
stated,
I think that you have [to] sift through the history, and there is . . .
good legislative and bad legislative history. The bad history is the
kind . . . that you see on C-Span where someone is speaking to an
empty chamber and has carte blanche to revise his or her remarks to
say anything at all. Good legislative history or better legislative

37

Id. at 48.
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting:
A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 575-76 (2002).
39
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). As
Judge Politan aptly noted at the conference, “you can’t do that because you have
litigators in front of you, you have people who want [and have a right to] answers to
their problem.” Conference Transcript, supra note 28, at 34.
38
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history . . . is to look at the sponsor of a bill, or some of the major
players who are involved in passing a particular bill . . . .40

For Politan, the task was similar: “to sift through it, determine
what is hot stuff, what is good stuff, what is bad stuff . . . and
then make a judgment.”41
Without legislative history, the judges saw the job for
what it is: policy making cabined by the alternative choices
presented in the cases. Judge Orlofsky did make reference to
those nasty little judicial constructs of legislative intent known
as “canons of statutory construction,” but quickly labeled them
as a “dangerous approach,” because each side in the battle
usually can find an equal number of canons to support its
position.42 But ultimately Judge Orlofsky concluded that his role
was to make a “judgment call.”43 Judge Politan had a broader
view of the role of legislative history in the process of statutory
interpretation: “You bring to that decision your own background,
your own thoughts about the matter, and in essence perhaps you
do put yourselves in the position of being the super legislators.
Somebody had to do it. The buck stops with the judiciary.”44 And
as for Judge Cowan, the senior judge on the panel, he reflected
that Scalia’s textualism had informed his own decision-making
process: “In most legislative interpretation [cases] I’m pretty
much a follower of Justice Scalia . . . . You look at the text and
decide what to do.”45 But Judge Cowan noted that, in some cases,
judges are forced into the role of “playing God.”46 And by “playing
God,” Judge Cowan meant that a judge’s primary objective
should be to reach a just decision:
I think I have to be brutally honest with you and say the
unspeakable, that I would decide the case based on what I perceive
to be the most just manner of resolving the matter before me, and
that all of these tools of legislative history, canons and so forth,
would merely be techniques that I would employ to write a
decision. . . . I think that’s what Courts do and I think we have to say
it as it is, and that’s how I would resolve the matter.47

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Conference Transcript, supra note 28, at 37.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 43-44.
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The conversation then turned to the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
through which Congress explicitly overruled the Ward’s Cove
decision and placed the burden of persuasion for the business
defense on employers.
The 1991 provision led almost immediately to litigation
over whether the new law would apply retroactively to
plaintiffs with pending claims. On this point, the statute was
silent. The Senate had discussed the retroactivity of the law,
but it could not reach an agreement.48 Ultimately, the Senate
reached an impasse over the legislation on this timing issue
and agreed to punt.49 As a Senate staff member remarked, “We
didn’t have the votes on the left [for retroactivity]. . . . The deal
was cut to . . . leave it to the courts to pound out the issue.”50
And that is exactly what the courts did, until the matter finally
reached the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,51
in which the Court decided against retroactivity on the basis of
a canon that required explicit statutory language for
retroactive application.
I asked each of the judges at the conference how they
would have decided this case. Politan and Cowen voted against
retroactivity; Orlofsky favored it.
CONCLUSION
What I think we can learn from the above exchanges is
that it is impossible to establish a law-based rule, in the way
Scalia suggests, for the interpretation of unclear statutes. While
clear language should always govern, in most cases, the language
of the statute is not clear. Unclear statutes inevitably place a
policy decision on the judiciary. Probative legislative history
reduces that burden and, most importantly, reflects legislative
meaning. Without legislative history, it is always a judgment call.
The “intelligible theory” that Scalia champions just doesn’t cut it.
That is what each of the judges above tells us in describing their
personal experiences with statutory interpretation.

48

Id. at 50.
Id.
50
Dispute over Retroactivity of Civil Rights Act Stems from Legislative
History, Hill Staffer Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 14, Jan. 22, 1992, at A-13.
51
511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994).
49

